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Explaining Tax Compliance
James Aim
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"Always try to be honest. It will gratify some, and astonish all the rest."
Mark Twain
The Puzzle of Tax Compliance
Tax evasion is an economic crime, perhaps the most common eco 
nomic crime, and it appears to be a large and growing problem, both in 
the United States and elsewhere. Despite obvious difficulties in mea 
surement, the Internal Revenue Service (1990) estimates for the United 
States that the tax gap, or the amount of unpaid federal income taxes, 
was between $83 billion and $93 billion in 1987 and had grown at an 
average annual rate of over 10 percent over the last two decades; more 
recent estimates by the Internal Revenue Service (1993) put the tax gap 
in 1991 at over $111 billion. Similar work for other countries suggests 
that tax evasion is an even more severe problem elsewhere (Tanzi 
1982; Feige 1989). Such underreporting has a variety of harmful 
effects: it reduces the tax revenues of the government, it affects public 
provision of goods and services, it creates misallocations in resource 
use, it alters the distribution of income in unpredictable ways, it 
increases feelings of unfair treatment by government, and it generates 
disrespect for the law.
Still the puzzle of tax compliance (at least for economists) is not so 
much "Why is there so much cheating?" Instead, the real puzzle is "Why 
is there so little cheating?" This may seem surprising. However, most 
people pay most of their taxes most of the time, even though the chances 
of detection are quite small and the penalties on evasion are also 
extremely light. For example, in the United States in recent years less 
than 1 percent of all individual income tax returns are audited by the 
Internal Revenue Service, and the penalty on even fraudulent evasion is 
only 75 percent of unpaid taxes. Most economic models of taxpayer 
behavior conclude that there should be much more tax evasion than is
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actually observed. The puzzle of tax compliance—and the challenge 
facing people working in this area—is to explain why people pay taxes.
The study of tax compliance has grown enormously in the last 
twenty years. Still, there is much about compliance that is not under 
stood. My purpose in this lecture is to discuss some work my col 
leagues and I have done that attempts to explain the factors underlying 
tax compliance behavior. My basic conclusion is that the explanation 
of compliance requires us to recognize the myriad range of factors that 
motivate individual behavior, factors that go much beyond the standard 
economics-of-crime approach that economists typically invoke, to 
include theories of behavior suggested by psychologists, sociologists, 
and other social scientists. Admittedly, such a broadening in the scope 
of analysis is a difficult one for economists to make. However, unless 
this approach is taken—and experimental economics can help here— 
we will not be able to explain the levels of compliance actually 
observed or to devise policies to increase compliance.
The next section discusses the major elements that I believe must be 
included in any theory of tax compliance. It is followed by a section 
explaining one of the methods that many people have found useful in 
explaining compliance: experimental economics. The section after that 
presents some of the results of experimental studies performed by my 
colleagues and me. The last section discusses some conclusions and 
observations.
Theories of Tax Compliance
This section outlines the major elements that, I believe, enter the tax 
compliance decision of individuals. These factors include the standard 
elements of audit and penalty rates. However, they also include several 
factors suggested by alternative theories of behavior under uncertainty. 
They are summarized in table 1.
Table 1. Main Factors in Tax Compliance Behavior
• Detection and Punishment
• Overweighting of Low Probabilities
• Burden of Taxation
• Government Services
• Social Norms
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Detection and Punishment
The dominant economics approach to the analysis of tax compliance 
follows the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker 
(1968) and first applied to tax compliance by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972). In its simplest form, this approach assumes that an individual 
receives a fixed amount of income /, and must choose how much of this 
income to declare to the tax authorities and how much to underreport. 
The individual pays taxes at rate t on every dollar D of income that is 
declared, but pays no taxes on underreported income. However, the 
individual may be audited with some fixed probability p; if audited, 
then all underreported income is discovered, and the individual must 
pay a penalty at rate/on each dollar of deficient taxes, where/includes 
the unpaid taxes. If underreporting is detected, the individual's dispos 
able income equals
D), (1) 
while if underreporting is not detected income is 
IN = I-tD. (2)
Expected utility theory then suggests that the individual will choose 
declared income to maximize the expected utility EU(I) of the evasion 
gamble
EU(I) = PU(1C) + (1 - />)£/(/„), (3)
where E is the expectation operator and utility U(I) is assumed to be a 
function only of income.
It is straightforward to show that an increase in the probability of 
detection p and the penalty rate /unambiguously increase declared 
income D. Surprisingly, an increase in the tax rate / generally has an 
ambiguous effect on declared income; however, under standard 
assumptions about an individual's attitudes toward risk, a higher tax 
rate actually increases declared income.
This basic model has been extended in a variety of dimensions 
(Cowell 1990). In particular, the assumption that the probability of
106 Explaining Tax Compliance
detection is fixed for an individual (a random audit strategy) can be 
relaxed by allowing the audit agency to use information from the tax 
payers' returns in determining whom to select for audit and by examin 
ing the interaction of the taxpayers and the government collection 
agency in a game theory setting. Such "endogenous audit selection 
rules" are a central part of the enforcement strategies of many coun 
tries. Nevertheless, the essential features of this economics-of-crime 
model have largely remained the same.
Now this approach gives the sensible result that compliance depends 
upon enforcement. It is essential to recognize, however, that this 
approach also concludes that an individual pays taxes because—and 
only because—of the fear of detection and punishment. Again, this is a 
plausible and productive insight, with the obvious policy implication 
that the government can encourage greater tax compliance by increas 
ing the audit and penalty rates. However, I know of no serious student 
of tax compliance who believes that tax compliance can be explained 
entirely by the level of enforcement. As noted earlier, the levels of 
audit and penalty rates are set at such low levels in most all countries 
that a purely economic analysis of the tax evasion gamble implies that 
most individuals would evade if they are "rational" because it is 
unlikely that cheaters will be caught and penalized. However, such 
behavior is simply not observed, even in the most evasion-ridden econ 
omy.
Put differently, the standard economics approach to the analysis of 
tax compliance has some serious flaws as an explanation for observed 
compliance choices of individuals because it concludes that individuals 
should pay far less in taxes than they in fact do. It is clear that the indi 
vidual compliance decision either must be affected by other factors not 
mentioned by expected utility theory or must be affected in ways not 
captured by the theory.
Overweighting of Low Probabilities
Another factor is suggested by recent theoretical work by Kahne- 
man and Tversky (1979) and others, who argue that many individuals 
can overweight low probabilities, such as those relevant for tax compli 
ance. Suppose, for example, that the true probability of an audit is 1 
percent. In making their decision, however, many individuals, even 
when fully informed, will systematically behave as if they think the
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probability exceeds 1 percent, at least when their behavior is viewed 
from an expected utility perspective. Overweighting of low probabili 
ties may therefore provide an additional explanation for tax compli 
ance. If taxpayers give more weight to the probability of an audit than 
they ought to relative to an expected utility model, then compliance 
will be greater than the level suggested by the standard economics 
approach.
In fact, there is overwhelming empirical and experimental evidence 
that many (though not all) individuals overweight low-probability 
events: in their purchase of flood and earthquake insurance, in their 
willingness to pay to avoid exposure to hazardous substances, in their 
purchase of lottery tickets, and so on (Machina 1987; Davis and Holt 
1993). It can be shown that such overweighting leads to greater com 
pliance than predicted by expected utility theory.
The Burden of Taxation
A standard explanation for the rise of the underground economy is 
the general increase in the burden of taxation that has characterized 
most modern economies (Tanzi 1982; Feige 1989). In the face of 
higher burdens on reported income, it is argued that individuals will 
respond by reporting less income.
Now it must be remembered that the economics-of-crime approach 
does in fact conclude that tax compliance is affected by the level of tax 
rates. However, the theoretical and empirical strands of literature give 
different answers about the response of declared income to tax rates. 
As noted earlier, the typical theoretical result is that compliance actu 
ally rises as the tax rate rises. On the other hand, most empirical work 
finds that a higher tax rate discourages tax compliance (Clotfelter 
1983; Aim, Bahl, and Murray 1990). Although there is no doubt that 
compliance depends in some way on the burden of taxation, the precise 
way in which compliance responds to changes in the burden of taxa 
tion needs further analysis.
Government Services
Another factor in the compliance decision is the use of the taxes. 
However, the role of government expenditures in the tax compliance 
decision has until recently been neglected. As emphasized by Cowell
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and Gordon (1988, p. 305), "this seems a curious oversight, since 
while the government taketh away, it also giveth back, and the latter 
activity surely exerts some influence on evasion." The compliance 
decision of an individual therefore seems likely to depend in some way 
on the individual's receipt of government expenditures.
There is some work that is relevant here. A standard argument in 
public economics is that voluntary private provision of public goods 
will be inefficiently low because each individual will have an incentive 
to "free ride" on the private purchase of others (Samuelson 1954). In 
the context of tax compliance, this result suggests that most people will 
cheat. However, casual observation suggests that the likelihood of 
complete free riding is greatly overstated because instances of volun 
tary provision of public goods are widespread. Perhaps based upon 
these examples, there is now a large and growing literature (Axelrod 
1984; Bagnoli and McKee 1991) that argues that voluntary provision 
of public goods may not always play as a "prisoners' dilemma" game; 
that is, in many instances, individuals will in fact voluntarily contribute 
to a public good, or pay their taxes. This generally occurs when provi 
sion is both repeated and interdependent. In such a setting, one individ 
ual's decision to contribute—or to comply—depends upon his or her 
perception of what others will contribute, both now and in the future. If 
the individual believes that his or her contribution is in some sense 
essential (or "pivotal") to the provision of the public good, then free 
riding is no longer the unique dominant strategy for the individual. 
Instead, cooperation may become optimal.
This approach suggests that individuals may voluntarily pay taxes in 
part because they recognize that payment is necessary to get others to 
contribute and so to get government services that are valued.
Social Norms
A last factor is "social norms," which I believe may well be the most 
important factor. It is clearly difficult to be very precise on the exact 
meaning of social norms (Roth, Scholz, and Witte 1989). However, 
there is overwhelming evidence that many countries with roughly the 
same fiscal system also have far different compliance experiences. The 
only possible explanation that I can suggest is that these countries have 
different notions of what is socially acceptable behavior; that is, they 
exhibit different social norms.
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To illustrate, there is much survey evidence (Westat 1980; Yankel- 
ovich, Skelly, and White 1984) that suggests that compliance is 
strongly affected by the strength of and commitment to the social norm 
of compliance. These surveys conclude that:
• those who comply tend to view tax evasion as "immoral"
• compliance is higher if a "moral appeal" to taxpayers is made
• the low social standing of tax evaders may be a more effective 
deterrent than formal sanctions
• individuals with tax evaders as friends are more likely to be evad 
ers themselves
• compliance decreases with perceptions of unfair treatment
• evasion is associated with feelings of distrust and alienation
•compliance is greater in societies with a strong sense of social 
cohesion.
Further, anecdotal evidence suggests that some people won't pay their 
taxes if they dislike the way their taxes are spent, if they feel they have 
no say in the decision process, or if they feel that government is unre 
sponsive to their wishes. Some quotes from taxpayers illustrate these 
feelings (Yankelovich, Skelly, and White 1984):
• "I wouldn't mind it so much if I could designate where my tax dol 
lars went to. I resent having to find out why frogs in South America 
croak and things like that."
• "When we pay taxes, we like to know what it's going for."
• "Allow people to earmark a portion of their tax payments. Give 
them choices."
It seems clear to me that such sentiments pay an important, perhaps a 
dominant, role in tax compliance.
Social norms can be affected by a variety of government institutions 
and policies. There is much behavioral science evidence that implies 
that greater individual participation in the decision process will foster 
an increased level of compliance, in part because participation implies 
some commitment to the institution and such commitment in turn
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requires behavior that is consistent with words and actions. This notion 
implies that one dimension by which social norms can be affected is 
via individual participation in the decision process, say, by voting. 
Compliance seems likely to be higher when the use of tax revenues is 
decided by majority rule than when the (same) use is imposed on the 
group; further, knowing the outcome of the vote reveals information to 
each taxpayer about the level of group support for the collective deci 
sion, and this information may be useful to individuals in projecting 
the group behavior. Government decisions that are imposed are 
unlikely to generate such feelings of participation or to provide such 
information. Consequently, if taxpayers feel that they have voice in the 
way their taxes will be spent, then they are likely to feel more inclined 
to pay their taxes.
Another dimension by which social norms may be affected is the 
level of popular support for the government program. Widespread sup 
port tends to legitimize the public sector, and so imposes some social 
norm to pay taxes. This support may be obviously revealed through the 
voting process. However, the level of support seems likely to affect 
compliance even when the choice of the public good is imposed on 
members of the group. Consequently, it seems likely that there will be 
more tax compliance when the public good imposed on a community is 
popular, even if individuals are unable to articulate directly their sup 
port via voting.
Still another dimension by which social norms can be changed is the 
community commitment to enforcing the tax laws. If the perception 
becomes widespread that the government is not willing to detect and 
penalize evaders, then such a perception legitimizes tax evasion. The 
rejection of sanctions sends a signal to each individual that others do 
not wish to enforce the tax laws and that tax evasion is in some sense 
socially acceptable. The social norm of compliance disappears. Such 
an outcome is common in many countries, such as the Philippines and 
Italy where it seems to be accepted that tax evasion is the norm.
Summary
These factors are clearly only some of the elements in the individual 
compliance decision, and there are numerous other factors that affect 
this decision: uncertainty about the fiscal system, the use of paid pre-
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parers and advisors, the withholding of taxes, rewards for honest decla 
rations, the potential for tax amnesties, the joint choice of tax 
avoidance and tax evasion, and so on. Nevertheless, I believe that these 
factors together play dominant roles in tax compliance. Methods to 
investigate the importance of their roles are discussed next.
Experimental Methods and Experimental Design
There are essentially two broad methodological alternatives to the 
use of experimental methods in the study of tax compliance: theoreti 
cal and empirical methods. Each has generated insights, but each is 
also subject to some serious problems. Before discussing the experi 
mental approach to compliance, it is useful to begin by outlining the 
strengths and, more important, the limitations of theoretical and empir 
ical analyses as a way of justifying the use of experimental methods as 
an additional tool in the study of tax compliance.
Theoretical Approaches
Virtually all theoretical work on tax compliance relies in some form 
on the expected utility model. This approach has generated many 
insights, especially regarding how an individual responds to greater 
enforcement activities and how government can optimally choose its 
enforcement strategy. However, this literature is in a sense too com 
plex. It is only in the simpler models that clear-cut analytical results 
can be generated on the compliance impact of basic policy parameters. 
When more complex dimensions of individual behavior are introduced, 
the theoretical results generally become ambiguous. It is doubtful that 
theoretical analysis will yield more meaningful results in the future.
Paradoxically, the theoretical models of individual choice are also 
too simple. There are numerous factors that affect the reporting deci 
sions of individuals, but theoretical models are capable of including 
only a few.
Most important, and as emphasized above, the limited ability to 
incorporate many relevant factors or to incorporate them in a meaning 
ful way has meant that theories based upon expected utility theory are 
unable to explain the level of tax reporting. In particular, these models
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generally imply that rational individuals should pay far less in taxes 
than they actually do. This is not a mere quibble. It goes to the heart of 
the standard approach to explaining compliance.
Empirical Literature
The obvious difficulty in applied work is the absence of reliable 
information on individual reporting behavior. This information is hard 
to come by, either for the Untied States or for other countries: it is dif 
ficult to measure something that by its very nature people want to con 
ceal. This difficulty has not stopped researchers. However, there are 
obvious problems with the data that make much of this empirical work 
somewhat suspect.
For example, most empirical work for the United States has utilized 
data provided by the IRS through its Taxpayer Compliance Measure 
ment Program (TCMP), which contains a detailed line-by-line audit of 
a stratified random sample of roughly 50,000 individual tax returns 
conducted on a three-year cycle. These audits yield an IRS estimate of 
the taxpayer's "true" income so that a measure of individual tax eva 
sion can be calculated. However, until recently most researchers have 
not had access to the individual data, and instead have been forced to 
use TCMP data aggregated to the three-digit zip code level, an aggre 
gate measure likely to comprise disparate elements of underreporting 
that reflect very different motivational factors. TCMP data also have 
some well-recognized deficiencies: the audits do not detect all underre- 
ported income, nonfilers are not captured, honest errors are not identi 
fied, final audit adjustments are not included, and there are few 
noneconomic factors to which the data can be linked. The use of 
TCMP data for empirical estimation of the determinants of compliance 
behavior is therefore problematic. Data for other countries are even 
more flawed.
To avoid the problems with the TCMP data, some researchers have 
used aggregate measures of evasion, such as the gap between income 
reported on tax returns and income in the national income accounts. By 
necessity, these studies focus on the aggregate, not the individual, 
response. Other researchers have used surveys of taxpayers, in part to 
assess factors such as perceptions of the probability of detection, the 
fairness of taxation, and the responsiveness of government in the
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respondent's reporting decision. Unfortunately, these surveys are also 
subject to a number of methodological problems. Individuals may not 
remember their reporting decisions, they may not respond at all, or 
they may not respond truthfully. Surveys are also unable to control for 
many relevant determinants of compliance, and, given their response 
rates, surveys may not be representative of the population at large. 
Finally, they cannot determine the direction of causality between com 
pliance and its determinants; that is, statements regarding the unfair 
ness of a tax may result from a rationalization of noncompliance rather 
than be the cause of noncompliance.
Experimental Economics
Difficulties with the existing theoretical and empirical literatures 
have led to the use of experimental economics in compliance research, 
not so much as the only approach but as an additional approach. The 
use of laboratory experiments in economics began in the early 1960s 
with the work of Smith (1962, 1964) on resource allocation under 
alternative forms of market organization. Growth in its applications 
came with the establishment of a well-defined framework for experi 
mental work by Smith (1976, 1982) and Wilde (1980), and it is now 
widely accepted as a methodological approach in the analysis of theory 
and policy. Davis and Holt (1993) survey much of the experimental lit 
erature.
As discussed by Aim (1991), laboratory experiments seem particu 
larly well suited for the study of some aspects of the taxpayer reporting 
decision. Unlike theoretical work, experiments are not as constrained 
by the same degree of simplification required in analytical studies of 
reporting, which allows the impact of numerous factors not amenable 
to theoretical work to be examined. Unlike empirical work, experi 
ments generate data under different settings in which there is control 
over extraneous influences. As discussed below, there are some obvi 
ous limitations of experimental methods. However, given the weak 
nesses of other methodologies, there are compelling reasons for the use 
of experiments.
Creating a microeconomic system: induced value theory
Experimental economics involves the creation of a real microeco 
nomic system in the laboratory, one that parallels the naturally occur-
114 Explaining Tax Compliance
ring world that is the subject of investigation. The essence of such a 
system is control over the environment, the institutions, and the prefer 
ences that subjects face. Of these, control over preferences is particu 
larly crucial. As stated by Smith (1976, p. 275), "such control can be 
achieved by using a reward structure to induce prescribed monetary 
value on actions."
Smith (1982) identifies several (sufficient) conditions that must be 
satisfied for control over preferences to be established: (1) "nonsatia- 
tion"—subjects must prefer more to less; (2) "saliency"—the rewards 
received by subjects must be related to their decisions, so that subjects 
recognize that their actions affect their outcomes; (3) "reward domi 
nance"—rewards must be large enough to offset any subjective costs or 
benefits that subjects place on participation in the experiment, which 
requires the payment to subjects of an amount comparable to what they 
could earn outside the laboratory; and (4) "privacy"—each subject 
must know only his or her own payoffs so that they do not receive any 
subjective value from the payoffs of other subjects.
Several procedures should also be followed in experimental eco 
nomics. For example, the experiment should be administered in a uni 
form and consistent manner to allow replicability. The experiment 
should not be excessively long or complicated, since subjects may 
become bored or confused. Subjects must believe that the procedures 
described to them are the procedures actually followed. The instruc 
tions provided to subjects should be understandable, should avoid the 
use of examples that lead subjects to anchor on certain choices that are 
the subject of the experiment, and should be phrased in "neutral" rather 
than "loaded" terms, to mask the context of the experiment and to 
avoid direct reference to the real-world phenomena under investiga 
tion. Neutrality increases the experimenter's control over subject pref 
erences and avoids leading subjects to invoke different "mental 
scripts," which may enable them to fill in (potentially) missing infor 
mation in the instructions but which also may unpredictably influence 
their choices. It is sometimes claimed that the use of neutral instruc 
tions limits the ability to generalize from the experimental to the natu 
rally occurring setting. In fact, however, it is not possible to generalize 
beyond the laboratory unless one uses neutral instructions, since the 
experimenter cannot control (or induce) the values that subjects associ 
ate with loaded terms.
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Experimental work on taxpayer compliance
The basic design of most compliance experiments is similar, and is 
summarized in table 2. Human subjects in a controlled laboratory are 
told that they should feel free to make as much income as possible. At 
the beginning of each round of the experiment, each subject is given 
income and must decide how much income to report. Taxes are paid at 
some rate on all reported, but not on underreported, income. However, 
underreporting is discovered with some probability, and the subject 
must then pay a fine on unpaid taxes. This process is repeated for a 
given number of rounds. At the completion of the experiment, each 
subject is paid an amount (the accumulated earnings) that depends on 
his or her performance during the experiment. Into this microeconomic 
system, various policy changes can be introduced: changes in audit 
probabilities or audit rules, in penalty rates, in tax rates, in public good 
provision, and in institutions that affect social norms. Some results 
from experiments run by my colleagues and me are discussed in the 
next section.
Table 2. Basic Design of Tax Compliance Experiments
• Student subjects are used.
• Subjects are fully informed.
• Subjects are organized into groups that stay together throughout the 
experiment.
• The known number of rounds is predetermined but unannounced.
• Subjects receive income in each round.
• Subjects must choose in each round how much income to declare.
• Declared income is taxed; in those experiments with a public good, all 
taxes finance the public good.
• Undeclared income is not taxed, but subjects face some chance of audit 
and penalty.
• Subjects are paid their accumulated earnings at the end of the experiment, 
generally $10 to $30 depending upon their performance.
• Parameters are set at their "real-world" levels.
• Experiments are fully computerized, and last one hour.
• Variations include changes in audit rates and rules, in fine rates, in tax 
rates, in public good provision, and in subject participation via voting on 
the fiscal system.
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Limitations of experimental economics
There are sound reasons for caution in interpreting and generalizing 
experimental results. Some early compliance experiments did not fol 
low now widely accepted procedures of the experimental paradigm, 
such as the use of repeated experiments and neutral instructions. Much 
early work also lacked realism because values of the various policy 
parameters did not approximate real-world values.
Although more recent experimental research has generally 
addressed these problems, some concerns remain, some of which are 
more real than others. A common criticism of experimental economics 
is that the student subjects typically used may not be representative of 
taxpayers. However, there is now much evidence that the experimental 
responses of students are no different from the responses of other sub 
ject pools (Plott 1987); there is also no reason to believe that the cogni 
tive processes of students are different from "real" people. Another 
common criticism is that it is not possible to control for many relevant 
factors in the laboratory. However, if one cannot control for such fac 
tors in the laboratory where the experimenter establishes the institu 
tions, the rules, and the reward structure, then one cannot hope to 
control for these factors in the "naturally occurring world."
Of more legitimate concern, the results may well be sensitive to the 
specific experimental design, so that replication is crucial. It is also 
possible that subjects may modify their behavior simply because they 
know that they are participating in an experiment. Most important, 
there is a certain artificiality in a laboratory setting. A decision to 
report $2 in an experiment is clearly different from a decision to report 
actual income on an annual tax return, even if the laboratory incentives 
are salient. In particular, the laboratory setting cannot capture a cata 
strophic loss such as jail, and it cannot capture the social stigma that 
some surveys suggest is an important factor in taxpayer reporting. In 
short, one must use the results from laboratory experiments with some 
care. However, such use depends largely upon the purpose of the 
experiment. According to Roth (1987), experiments can be classified 
into three broad categories that depend upon the dialogue in which 
they are meant to participate. "Speaking to Theorists" includes those 
experiments designed to test well-articulated theories. "Searching for 
Facts" involves experiments that examine the effects of variable about
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which existing theory has little to say. "Whispering in the Ears of 
Princes" identifies those experiments motivated by specific policy 
issues. To date, most experiments on taxpayer reporting fall into the 
first two categories. Although this now seems to be changing some 
what, it is likely to be some time before a serious and ongoing dialogue 
with the princes of the IRS is established.
Experimental Evidence on Tax Compliance
There are a number of excellent experimental analyses of tax com 
pliance, such as Beck, Davis, and Jung (1991), Collins and Plumlee 
(1991), and Webley et al. (1991). However, I will limit my discussion 
to some experimental results from papers by my colleagues and 
myself. It is somewhat difficult to compare these results because the 
specific experimental design often differs for the papers. For example, 
the number of periods subject to audit varies over the studies, the pen 
alty rates also varies, and tax payments are sometimes used to provide 
a public good. Nevertheless, in their entirety these papers give, I 
believe, a good indication of the importance of the various factors dis 
cussed above in the tax compliance behavior of individuals. The exper 
imental results are summarized in table 3.
The Impact of Detection and Punishment
Audit rates and rules
Several papers have varied the probability of detection p, in which 
the probability is assumed to be random and independent of any tax 
payer decisions (Aim, McClelland, and Schulze 1992; Aim, Jackson, 
and McKee 1992b; Aim, Cronshaw, and McKee 1993). In general, the 
results for these "random audit rules" clearly indicate that compliance 
increases with a greater audit rate, with an estimated declared income- 
audit rate elasticity of 0.17. However, the increase in compliance 
appears to be small and nonlinear. This suggests the important result 
that there are limits to how much government can increase compliance 
by increasing the probability of detection.




Table 3. Experimental Results: Average Compliance Rate
Audit rates and rules
Paper-design
A: Public good/single period audits// = 15// = .40
Paper-design
B: No public good/back audits//= 2/t = .30
Paper-design
C: No public good/single period audits#"= 2/t = .30
Paper-design
















B: No public good/back audits/p = .04/f = .30
Overweighting
There is substantially greater compliance at low probabilities than is predicted by 
risk-neutral behavior in papers A, B, C, D, E, and F.
Tax rates
Paper-design

















A: Single period audits//= l5/p = .02//= .40
Reward Paper-design
44.8% B: Back audits//= 2/p = .04// = .03
Social norms
MRD MRS JFC INC NPG Paper-design
45.2 41.1 33.7 8.1 33.7 E/back audits// = 2/p = .04/t = .30
Voter rejection of greater enforcement via majority rule is followed by near-zero 
compliance, while voter acceptance of greater enforcement via majority rule with 
"cheap talk" is followed by near-complete compliance, in paper F. ________
Paper A: Aim, McClelland, and Schulze ( 1 992).
Paper B : Aim, Jackson, and McKee ( 1 992b).
Paper C: Aim, Cronshaw, and McKee ( 1 993).
Paper D: Aim, Jackson, and McKee ( 1 992a).
Paper E: Aim, Jackson, and McKee ( 1 993).
Paper F: Aim, McClelland, and Schulze ( 1 993).
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Another paper has varied the nature of the audit rule (Aim, Cron- 
shaw, and McKee 1993). A central and obvious feature of the compli 
ance process in most countries is that the government tax agency uses 
information from the tax returns to determine strategically whom to 
audit. Such a policy means that the probability of audit is not fixed and 
random but instead is variable and endogenous, dependent in part on 
the behavior of the taxpayer (and the tax agency).
Different "endogenous audit rules" are examined in experiments in 
this paper. One rule assumes that an audited individual found to be 
noncompliant in the current period will be audited with certainty for a 
number of future periods ("Conditional Future Audit" rule, or CFA). 
Another rule requires that an audited individual will face some back 
audits if found to be noncompliant in the current period ("Conditional 
Back Audit" rule, or CBA). A third rule imposes a cutoff ("Cutoff 
rule, or CO); a taxpayer who reports less than some cutoff level of 
income will be audited with certainty.
Experimental results indicate that endogenous audit rules are able to 
generate compliance significantly greater than random audit rules, 
even when the random audit rate is 30 or 50 percent. The cutoff rule 
CO is the most effective in increasing compliance, although it requires 
a large number of audits. Making back audits conditional on current 
declarations (or CBA) is also able to increase compliance significantly, 
and the audit rate is far lower than the cutoff rule. A conditional future 
audit rule CFA appears to be the least effective of the endogenous 
rules, although compliance still exceeds that under all random audit 
rules.
These results suggest that:
In the relevant range of audit rate changes, compliance increases 
marginally and nonlinearly with increases in the probability of 
detection. Also, compliance is significantly greater with endoge 
nous audit selection rules than with random audit rules.
Work by other experimentalists generally gives similar results.
Penalty rates
Variations in the penalty rate/are also examined in Aim, Jackson, 
and McKee (1992b). Experimental results indicate that individuals pay
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slightly more in taxes when the penalty on detected evasion increases. 
Therefore:
In the relevant range of penalty rate changes, compliance 
increases marginally with increases in the fine rate on unpaid 
taxes.
However, the impact is quite small, with a reported income-fine rate 
elasticity of only 0.04.
The Impact of Overweighting
Several experiments across all studies are designed explicitly to test 
for the presence of overweighting of low probabilities. In these experi 
ments the parameters—especially the probability of detection—are 
sometimes chosen such that the optimal strategy for a risk-neutral indi 
vidual is to report zero income. Nevertheless, the experimental results 
clearly indicate that there is far more compliance than is predicted by 
expected utility theory, a result consistent with overweighting.
These results suggest that:
Many individuals substantially overweight low probabilities.
Although greater compliance may well be implied by other factors as 
well, these results are similar to much other experimental work on 
behavior at low probability events.
The Impact of Taxation
Another set of experiments varies the tax rate t on declared income, 
from 10 to 30 to 50 percent, and the level of compliance falls signifi 
cantly with tax rate increases (Aim, Jackson, and McKee 1992a). The 
declared income-tax rate elasticity is estimated to equal -0.52. There 
fore:
Compliance decreases with increases in the tax rate.
These results are consistent with most empirical evidence, even though 
much theoretical work concludes that compliance should rise with 
greater tax rates.
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The Impact of Government Services
In several papers a public good is present whose magnitude depends 
upon the tax payments of all subjects (Aim, McClelland, and Schulze 
1992; Aim, Jackson, and McKee 1992b). These tax payments are 
summed across the subjects, this sum is increased by some multiple m 
to reflect the (potential) consumers' surplus that individuals derive 
from government provision of a public good, and the resulting amount 
is then divided equally among the subjects. Note that a multiplier 
greater than 1 implies that individuals as a group receive more than 
they pay in taxes.
All experiments clearly indicate that compliance is greater in the 
presence of the public good than in its absence; also, compliance 
increases in a nonlinear way with the multiplier m.
Some additional experiments also vary the nature of the positive 
inducement given to taxpayers: by making audited and fully compliant 
taxpayers eligible for a "Lottery" whose expected value equals the 
average subject per round income, or by giving audited and fully com 
pliant taxpayers an immediate "Reward" of comparable value. In both 
cases the presence of a positive inducement leads to greater compli 
ance.
These results suggest that:
Compliance increases when individuals receive something for 
their tax payments.
There is some evidence that tax agencies around the world are starting 
to pursue such a "kinder, gentler" strategy.
The-Impact of Social Norms
Manipulating social norms is perhaps the most difficult task facing 
experimentalists, and there are few studies in which such control has 
been achieved. Nevertheless, some of my work has, I believe for the 
first time, been able to induce predictable changes in social norms, 
with resulting impacts on tax compliance.
One study examines the effects on compliance of the uses of tax rev 
enues and the decision process by which these uses are chosen (Aim, 
Jackson, and McKee 1993). In some experiments subjects must choose 
between using their tax payments on one of two alternative public
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goods; the level of support for the public good alternatives also varies 
between strong and weak support for the public good. These experi 
ments are denoted MRD (for "Majority Rule over Diverse" choices, in 
which the level of support for the preferred outcome is known to be 
quite strong) and MRS (for "Majority Rule over Similar" choices, in 
which the level of support for the preferred outcome is known to be 
quite weak). In other experiments subjects are not allowed to vote on 
public good provision, and a public good of variable popularity is 
instead imposed on the group. These experiments are denoted IFC (for 
"Imposed Favored Choice," in which the imposed public good is 
known to be popular) and INC (for "Imposed Nonfavored Choice," in 
which the imposed public good is known to be unpopular). Finally, in 
one experiment there is no public good (or NPG, for "No Public 
Good"). The experiments are structured so that the same use of tax rev 
enues occurs in all experiments except INC and NPG.
These experimental results indicate that compliance is significantly 
greater when subjects choose via voting the use of their taxes than 
when the identical use is imposed upon them; compare MRD versus 
IFC and MRS versus IFC. Further, compliance is somewhat greater 
when the vote is decisive than when the vote is close (MRD versus 
MRS). Finally, compliance is significantly lowered by the imposition 
of an unpopular program (IFC versus INC); in fact, compliance is 
lower with an imposed, unpopular public good than in the complete 
absence of any public good (INC versus NPG). These results clearly 
show that government can change the social norm of compliance by 
ensuring that individuals have a say in the decision process and by 
spending taxes in ways consistent with citizen preferences. Such poli 
cies have seldom been thought to be part of general strategy for tax 
compliance, but nonetheless they appear to be effective tools.
A second study allows subjects to vote via majority rule on the 
enforcement regime that they face, such as the tax, audit, and penalty 
rate (Aim, McClelland, and Schulze 1993). These results are still 
somewhat tentative. However, I believe that this voting allows the sub 
jects to alter the social norm of compliance. In particular, in all cases 
(except one, as discussed in a moment) subjects vote against greater 
enforcement such as higher audit or penalty rates, even when it is indi 
vidually and socially optimal to increase enforcement. Following these 
votes tax compliance falls virtually to zero, even though compliance
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prior to the vote is quite substantial. Rejection by the group of greater 
enforcement sends a clear signal to each individual that tax evasion 
will be tolerated and accepted; that is, rejection changes the social 
norm of compliance, and individuals respond accordingly.
Social norms can also be affected by communication among mem 
bers of the group, however. In an additional experiment in this paper, 
subjects are allowed to talk with one another before the vote on 
enforcement is taken (or "cheap talk")- In these discussions subjects 
quickly discover that it is in their interests to impose strict sanctions on 
free-riders, in order to increase their share of the public good. They 
then vote overwhelmingly in favor of greater enforcement, and tax 
compliance following the vote approaches 100 percent. Again, I 
believe that the cheap talk in combination with the vote allows individ 
uals to change the social norm, in this case to demonstrate that evasion 
will not be accepted.
These conclusions are striking:
Social norms can be changed by fiscal institutions. Compliance is 
increased when individuals participate via voting in the process by 
which the use of tax revenues is decided, when the outcome of the 
vote reveals widespread support for the program, and when the 
use of tax revenues is popular even if imposed. Also, compliance 
is decreased when there is a social expression via voting of a will 
ingness to tolerate tax evasion, and compliance is increased when 
there is a social expression via voting of an unwillingness to toler 
ate tax evasion.
There is also some experimental evidence that tax amnesties may 
change social norms (Aim, McKee, and Beck 1990).
These conclusions suggest a variety of alternative government poli 
cies toward tax compliance that are only now beginning to be used.
Summary and Conclusions
People exhibit much diversity in their behavior, and they are moti 
vated by a variety of factors. There are individuals who always cheat 
and those who always comply, some who maximize the expected util 
ity of the tax evasion gamble, others who seem to overweight low
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probabilities, individuals who respond in different ways to changes in 
their tax burden, some who are at times cooperative and at other times 
free-riders, and many who are guided by social norms.
These findings in total suggest that a government compliance strat 
egy based only on detection and punishment may well be a reasonable 
starting point but not a good ending point. Instead, what is needed is a 
multifaceted approach that emphasizes enforcement, but that also 
emphasizes such things as positive rewards from greater tax compli 
ance, the wise use of taxpayer dollars, and individual participation in 
the decision process. What is also needed, however, is a theory of tax 
compliance that incorporates the remarkable diversity in individual 
behavior exhibited by these experimental analyses of taxpayer compli 
ance. Whether any such theory can be developed that explains the 
behavior of all individuals at all times, or even one that explains the 
actions of the same person at all times, is hard to determine. However, 
until this effort is made, I think it unlikely that we will come much 
closer to explaining the puzzle of tax compliance.
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